21/07/2026
Having a whistleblowing channel is no longer enough: the Port of Valencia case calls into question ‘turnkey’ services
by Iván Martínez, CEO of Intedya
The formal establishment of a whistleblowing channel is no longer sufficient to demonstrate compliance with Law 2/2023. The case of the Valencia Port Authority shows that the real risk may lie in the way the Internal Reporting System has been set up and, in particular, in the roles assigned to external service providers. According to information published by elDiario.es, the Independent Whistleblower Protection Authority (AIPI) has reportedly concluded preliminary investigations into the Valencia Port Authority’s internal reporting channel and has found sufficient evidence to refer the matter to the department responsible for disciplinary proceedings. The case is said to have originated from an anonymous complaint and centres on the scope of the functions entrusted to the company contracted to manage the reporting channel.
The issue is significant because the Port Authority is not being criticised for the absence of a reporting channel, but rather for a possible irregular outsourcing of functions which the legislation reserves for the Head of the Internal Reporting System. It is advisable, however, to exercise due caution. The Port Authority informed the aforementioned media outlet that, by a decision dated 14 April 2026, the investigation and preliminary inquiry phase had been declared concluded, but that at that time it had no formal record of disciplinary proceedings having been initiated. Nor has a full decision on this case been found on the AIPI’s public website. Consequently, no final sanction has yet been imposed, and any liability will have to be determined within the relevant proceedings, with all applicable safeguards in place.
The contract that has brought the outsourcing issue to the fore
According to the published information, in May 2023 the Port Authority entered into a three-year contract, worth 74,959 euros (including VAT), for the management of its internal whistleblowing channel. The tender specifications reportedly assigned tasks to the supplier such as analysing communications, determining whether there was reasonable evidence, recommending the scope of investigations, issuing reasoned reports and providing investigative services. The legal issue does not lie in contracting a technology platform or in seeking specialist external advice. The controversy arises when the provider ceases to be merely instrumental and effectively assumes central functions in the receipt, investigation or assessment of cases.
Act 2/2023 permits an external third party to manage certain aspects of the system, but requires that such management be of an exclusively instrumental nature. Furthermore, in public administrations, outsourcing may only be agreed upon where it is demonstrated that in-house resources are insufficient, in accordance with public sector procurement legislation.
AIPI Recommendation 1/2026 sets out this criterion in greater detail: in the public sector, external involvement must be limited to the procedure for receiving information, whilst the processing, investigation and substantive decisions must remain the responsibility of the obligated body.
The recent Recommendation 3/2026, which applies to the General State Administration and its instrumental bodies, emphasises the same separation. The platform may be operated by a specialist provider, but decisions regarding the acceptance, investigation and resolution of cases always rest with the System Manager. It also recommends that external contracts incorporate enhanced safeguards regarding confidentiality, security, data protection and restricted access to case files.
The Reporting Channel and the Internal Reporting System are not the same thing
This case highlights a confusion that is still common. The channel is merely the means by which communications are received, whilst the Internal Reporting System also encompasses the designated officer and the entire management procedure. An organisation may outsource the technology required to receive anonymous communications, maintain a secure dialogue with the whistleblower, retain documents or record the audit trail of accesses. It may also seek legal, forensic or technical assistance for certain procedures.
What it should not do is allow the provider to replace the System Manager or reduce the System Manager’s role to a mere formal validation of decisions already taken externally. The distinction is not always straightforward. A third party may analyse documentation or draw up a technical report at the request of the person in charge, but should not decide on their own whether a communication is admissible, independently define the subject matter and scope of the investigation, direct the proceedings or determine the final outcome of the case.
The AIPI is likely to take account of the actual circumstances of the management process and not merely the term used in the contract. A service presented as ‘advice’ may exceed legal limits if, in practice, the service provider controls key decisions.
A potential very serious infringement
The published information links the potential breach to Article 63.1.g) of Law 2/2023, which classifies failure to comply with the obligation to have an Internal Reporting System in accordance with the legally required terms as a very serious infringement. For legal entities, very serious infringements may result in fines of between 600,001 and 1,000,000 euros. The law also allows for ancillary measures to be imposed, such as a public reprimand or the publication of the final penalty in the Official State Gazette. However, not every contractual shortcoming automatically leads to the maximum penalty. The proceedings must determine what functions the supplier actually performed, what control the Port Authority retained, whether external recommendations were binding, who made the decisions, and whether the arrangement substantially affected the independence and functioning of the system.
It is therefore more accurate to state that the entity could face the maximum penalty if the facts were ultimately classified as a very serious infringement, rather than to suggest that a fine of one million euros has already been imposed or will necessarily be imposed.
Impact on the ‘turnkey’ ethical channel market
The scope of the case extends beyond the Valencia Port Authority. In recent years, comprehensive solutions have been marketed under terms such as ‘outsourced reporting channel’, ‘full management of the reporting channel’ or ‘turnkey ethical reporting channel’.
In some models, the provider does not merely provide the platform, but also receives the report, assesses its admissibility, maintains contact with the whistleblower, carries out the legal assessment, proposes or carries out investigative procedures, and submits a virtually finalised report. The organisation formally retains a System Manager, but their role is limited to accepting or ratifying the work carried out by the third party. This model is being seriously called into question.
The consequence should not be the disappearance of specialised providers, but rather a more rigorous redefinition of their role. The market will have to clearly differentiate between three levels of service.
The technological infrastructure can be outsourced, including the platform, encryption, hosting, traceability and mechanisms for anonymous communication. Expert support may also be contracted through lawyers, auditors, investigators or forensic specialists, provided they act on behalf of and under the control of the System Manager. What cannot be transferred is decision-making responsibility for the case file.
Technology and specialist assistance may be procured from the market, but legal responsibility for the system must remain within the organisation.
The additional requirement for the public sector
Public bodies face a requirement that has often been overlooked. It is not sufficient to simply justify that a supplier has greater specialisation or that the procurement is economically advantageous. The body must demonstrate that it lacks sufficient in-house resources to undertake the management tasks it intends to outsource. This necessitates a review not only of the technical specifications, but also of the supporting documentation and the procurement files. A generic reference to the need for a specialised tool may not be sufficient if the specific internal capabilities that are lacking—and the reasons why the procurement is necessary—are not identified. There may therefore be two distinct risks: that the insufficiency of the organisation’s own resources has not been adequately justified and that, furthermore, the contract assigns to the successful tenderer substantive functions that go beyond the permitted instrumental support.
Implications for compliance frameworks
The case also has significant implications for criminal prevention systems. The internal reporting channel is one of the elements expressly provided for in the organisational and management models set out in Article 31 bis of the Criminal Code, as there is an obligation to report potential risks and breaches to the body responsible for monitoring the model. A poorly configured reporting channel does not automatically result in the loss of any potential exemption from or mitigation of criminal liability. Such an assessment will depend on the overall functioning of the model, the seriousness of the defect and its relationship to the offence under investigation.
However, excessive outsourcing may seriously undermine the organisation’s ability to demonstrate that its compliance system was effectively in place and functioning properly. It will be difficult to maintain the effectiveness of the compliance framework if the compliance body is unaware of how reports are received, does not direct investigations, or merely receives reports already prepared by the service provider. Independence, traceability and effective control over decisions are therefore relevant both from the perspective of Law 2/2023 and in terms of the compliance model’s evidential effectiveness.
This case suggests that contracts for internal reporting channels should be reviewed immediately, particularly those marketed as comprehensive services. The review should determine who receives the reports, who decides whether to accept them, who maintains contact with the whistleblower, who defines the investigative procedures, who has access to the evidence and who makes the final decision. It will also be necessary to check whether the System Manager has been formally appointed, whether they have sufficient autonomy and resources, whether instructions to the service provider are documented, whether there are differentiated access profiles, and whether the contract adequately regulates confidentiality, data protection, subcontracting and the safekeeping of information. In the public sector, it must also be verified that the lack of in-house resources is justified and that this justification corresponds to the contracted services.
A new phase in supervision
Although there is as yet no public and final sanctioning decision, the case of the Port of Valencia sends a clear message: supervision will no longer be limited to checking whether a link known as a ‘whistleblowing channel’ exists.
The AIPI is developing a framework under which the entire system architecture will be examined, including the independence of the person responsible, the separation of duties, information security, protection against retaliation and the effective oversight of investigations. ‘Turnkey’ services are not necessarily excluded from the market, but they must cease to be presented as a complete substitute for internal responsibilities. The provider may contribute technology, methodology and specialist knowledge; the organisation must retain control, decision-making authority and responsibility for the Internal Reporting System.
